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Abstract 
The sociological domain is different from the psychological one insofar as meaning can 
be communicated at the supra-individual level (Schütz, 1932; Luhmann, 1984). The 
computation of anticipatory systems enables us to distinguish between these domains in 
terms of weakly and strongly anticipatory systems with a structural coupling between 
them (Maturana, 1978). Anticipatory systems have been defined as systems which 
entertain models of themselves (Rosen, 1985). The model provides meaning to the 
modeled system from the perspective of hindsight, that is, by advancing along the time 
axis towards possible future states. Strongly anticipatory systems construct their own 
future states (Dubois, 1998a and b). The dynamics of weak and strong anticipations can 
be simulated as incursion and hyper-incursion, respectively. Hyper-incursion generates 
“horizons of meaning” (Husserl, 1929) among which choices have to be made by 
incursive agency.  
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Introduction 
 
In his mathematical theory of communication, Shannon detached himself from the 
communication of meaning by stating on the first page that the “semantic aspects of 
communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem” (Shannon & Weaver 
1949, at p. 3). However, his co-author Weaver noted the following:   
 
The concept of information developed in this theory at first seems disappointing and 
bizarre--disappointing because it has nothing to do with the meaning, and bizarre 
because it deals not with a single message but rather with the statistical character of a 
whole ensemble of messages, bizarre also because in these statistical terms the two 
words information and uncertainty find themselves to be partners. 
I think, however, that these should be only temporary reactions; and that one 
should say, at the end, that this analysis has so penetratingly cleared the air that one is 
now, perhaps for the first time, ready for a real theory of meaning. (Ibid., at pp. 116f.) 
 
Recent advances in the computation of anticipatory systems enable us to model both the 
generation of meaning by anticipatory agents and meaning-processing at the supra-
individual level. 
 
Luhmann (1971, 1984, and 1986) proposed to consider the processing of meaning as the 
autopoietic operation of both social and psychological systems. Social and psychological 
systems are both structurally coupled and “interpenetrate” each other reflexively 
(Luhmann, 1977). Interpenetration adds an operational dimension to the structural 
coupling between social and psychological systems (Luhmann, 1988 [1995a, at p. 51; 
2002, at p. 182]). In this study, we submit operationalizations of these various concepts in 
terms of the theory and computation of anticipatory systems (Rosen, 1985; Dubois, 
1998a; Leydesdorff, 2008, 2009). 
 
Meaning can first be provided to events by reflexive systems (e.g., observers) from the 
perspective of hindsight (Rosen, 1985). Human languages allow additionally for the 
construction and exchange of models using metaphors (Luhmann, 1995a, at p. 44; 2002, 
at p. 175; Leydesdorff & Hellsten, 2005). Metaphors enable us to communicate meaning 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Hesse, 1988; Maasen & Weingart, 1995). New meaning can 
also be generated as a result of inter-human communication (Schütz, 1932; Mead, 1934). 
When expectations are exchanged and interact, one can expect the development of a non-
linear dynamics of meaning-processing on top of the information exchanges (MacKay, 
1969; Maturana, 2000). Meaning is interactively and recursively reconstructed, but in an 
intentional mode, i.e., with reference to a future state (Husserl, 1929; Schutz, 1975). 
 
The perspective of hindsight—that is, entertaining a model which provides meaning to 
the modeled system (Rosen, 1985)—can itself be modeled as the backward evaluation of 
a difference equation (Dubois, 1998a). This has been called “incursion” in order to 
distinguish it from “recursion” which follows the arrow of time. For example, the well-
known logistic map xt+1 = axt  (1 – xt) can incursively be formulated as follows: 
 
 )1( 11 ++ −= ttt xaxx  (1) 
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and 
 )1(11 ttt xaxx −= ++  (2) 
 
In the case of Equation 1, the selection pressure (1 – x) on the variation (x) develops 
synchronously with the recursive development of the system. For example, markets select 
technological innovations in terms of current prices, while competing technologies can be 
expected to develop with reference to their previous states. Equation 2 has two roots: 
x = (a – 1)/a, and x = 0. These roots are the steady states of the logistic equation and the 
models of anticipatory systems that can be derived from it. 
 
By considering the future states as the drivers of the system in the present, three hyper-
incursive equations can additionally be formulated: 
 
 )1( 1+−= ttt xaxx  (3) 
 )1(1 ttt xaxx −= +  (4) 
 )1( 11 ++ −= ttt xaxx  (5) 
 
These equations model a “strongly anticipatory” system. While “weakly anticipatory” 
systems entertain models of themselves, strongly anticipatory ones use expectations to 
construct their current state. In other words, the incursive and hyper-incursive analogues 
of the logistic equation provide us with a model of how social systems of expectations 
can be reconstructed on the basis of interactions among weakly anticipatory systems 
(Leydesdorff & Dubois, 2004). 
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 The incursive model 
 
Using Equation 1, one can simulate a modeling system (Leydesdorff, 2005). One can also 
consider the modeling system as an observer (Spencer-Brown, 1969). The model 
appreciates the modeled system by filtering the noise, as can be understood by rewriting 
as follows:  
 
 )1( 11 ++ −= ttt xaxx  (1) 
 11 ++ −= tttt xaxaxx  (1a) 
 ttt axaxx =++ )1(1  (1b) 
 )1/(1 ttt axaxx +=+  (1c) 
 
Unlike the logistic map, this anticipatory system does not bifurcate, but develops along 
the curve of the steady state—x = (a – 1)/a)—for all values of a. Figure 1 shows the 
results of the simulation. The biological variation bifurcates and increasingly generates 
chaos for 3.57 < a < 4, while the anticipatory system grows continuously to the limit 
value of x = 1 with increasing values of a. 
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Figure 1: The steady state of the weakly anticipatory system. 
 
The line penciled into Figure 1 can be considered as an emerging axis stabilizing an 
identity among the reflections at each moment of time. The weakly anticipatory system 
provides meaning to the events by integrating them in both the biological domain (a < 4; 
e.g., bodily perceptions) and the social domain of meaning-processing (a ≥ 4). This 
integration of the different representations functions as a linchpin for developing a 
strongly anticipatory system in the cultural (i.e., non-natural) domain of meaning-
processing (a ≥ 0.4). 
 
The hyper-incursive model 
 
The hyper-incursive Equations 3, 4, and 5 provide us with the three building blocks of a 
non-linear dynamics of expectations (May, 1976; May & Leonard, 1975). Equation 3 first 
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evolves into x = (a – 1)/a. This is equal to the steady state of the weakly anticipatory 
system. In other words, weak anticipation can be considered as one of the sub-dynamics 
of a strongly anticipatory system. In Luhmann’s terminology, one could perhaps consider 
this correspondence as the re-entry of the first-order observation into the system of 
second-order observations (Luhmann, 1993 [1999]).  
 
Equation 4 evolves into xt+1 = (1/a) [xt / (1 – xt)]. This routine formalizes the reflexive 
operation: when xt > [a / (1 + a)] a pulse is generated which first overshoots the value of 
one,1 but then generates a negative value (Figure 2). The negative value provides a mirror 
image of the representation at a specific moment in time, and thus allows for a reflection. 
Reflection enables a system to bounce a communication. Note that the combination of 
Equations 3 and 4 provides the weakly anticipatory system with reflexive access to the 
meaning processing at the supra-individual level. 
                                                 
1 (1/a)[xt / (1 – xt)] = 1 for xt = a / (1 + a). 
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Figure 2: Simulation of Equation 4. 
 
Equation 5 invokes the perspective on social systems as introduced here: Ego and Alter 
are bound by a double contingency of expecting each other to be first historical and 
biological, but secondly reflexive and intentional (Parsons, 1968; Luhmann, 1984).  
Using the second layer of the double contingency, Ego in the present (xt) no longer refers 
to oneself as an identity which is rooted in the past, but to oneself in a future state (xt+1), 
that is, as an Alter Ego. The non-linear interactions among expectations can generate the 
social world as a system different from psychological ones. However, this social system 
of expectations remains structurally coupled to psychological ones; otherwise, nobody 
would be able to articulate the “horizons of meaning” which are generated.  
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Social coordination mechanisms are only perceptible by human beings after a reflexive 
turn (Giddens, 1984). Let us now show that reflexive decision-making is endogenous to 
the social system of expectations (Dubois, 1998b). Equation 5 can be rewritten as 
follows:  
 
 )1( 11 ++ −= ttt xaxx  (5) 
   2 11 ++ −= ttt axaxx
01
2
1 =+− ++ ttt xaxax  
0/1
2
1 =+− ++ axxx ttt  
 
In general, this equation has two solutions: 
 
 xt+1 = ½  ± ½ √[1 – (4/a) xt] (6) 
 
Given that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, the curve x = 0.5 ± 0.5 √ (1 – (4/a)) for x = 1 sets limits to the 
possible values reached by the social system (Figure 3). 
 
 9
 Figure 3: The social system as a result of hyper-incursion. 
 
For a ≥ 4, two sets of expectations are generated at each time step depending on the plus 
or the minus sign in the equation. After N time steps, 2N future states would be possible. 
Thus, the social system of expectations needs continuously a mechanism for making 
decisions between options because otherwise this system would rapidly become 
overburdened with uncertainty. 
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 Figure 4: Possible penetrations of the social system into the biological variation (a < 4).  
 
The term under the root in Equation 6 is positive for xt ≤ a/4: this condition is met for a ≥ 
4, but sets a borderline to the possible penetrations of the social system into the biological 
variation (a < 4). In Figure 4, this limitation is elaborated for a = 1.2 and xt = 0.35. Since 
in a next step xt+1 = 0.5, and thus larger than a/4 (= 0.3), the strongly anticipatory system 
would not be able to proceed with a next step to xt+2. Expectations cannot operate on 
expectations for a < 4, but next states of the natural system can be constructed on the 
basis of expectations like in the case of the socio-economic construction of technologies 
(Leydesdorff, 2006). 
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Decisions and historical trajectories 
 
The social system cannot further be developed at a ≥ 4 without a form of agency taking 
decisions because of the continuous production of uncertainty by the hyper-incursive 
mechanism (Eq. 5). Luhmann (2000) identified decisions as structuring organizations. 
Although this reflexive capacity is conceptualized by Luhmann as endogenous to the 
social system, organizations can also be attributed with institutional agency. A 
psychological system can then perhaps be considered as the minimal unit of reflection for 
making choices (Habermas 1981; Leydesdorff 2000, 2001). If decisions are socially 
further organized—for example, by using decision rules—an institutional layer can 
increasingly be shaped. The institutional layer provides a retention mechanism for the 
next round of expectations (Aoki 2001; Luhmann 2000). Thus, the social system is dually 
layered as a forward-moving retention mechanism and sets of possible expectations 
which flow through the networks. These “horizons of meaning” are not given, but 
continuously undergoing reconstruction (Luhmann 1990, 2002).  
 
The strongly anticipatory system is not autonomous, but autopoietic since structurally 
coupled to the layer of decision-making by weakly anticipatory agents (Collier 2006). 
Because the equations are derived from the same logistic equation, the steady states of 
the systems are equal: the systems are not only structurally coupled, but also coupled in 
terms of their reflexive operation. As noted, Luhmann (1977, 1995a [2002]) reserved the 
term “interpenetration” (Parsons, 1968, at p. 473; Luhmann, 1978) for this additional 
dimension in the coupling. Interpenetration is possible because of the evolutionary 
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achievement of developing human language ((Luhmann, 1995a, at p. 44; 2002, at p. 175; 
Leydesdorff 2002). Communication provides the strongly anticipatory system with one 
degree of freedom more than the weakly anticipatory ones. Unlike individuals, the social 
system can be expected to remain distributed. The uncertainty in the double contingency 
(Equation 5) is reproduced by the system and this makes the hyper-incursive anticipations 
unstable flows of communication.  
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Figure 4: Trajectory of a social system based on random decisions of the decision-
making units, for various values of the bifurcation parameter a. 
 
Figure 4 shows a simulation of trajectories for different values of a where decisions are 
taken randomly. The system sometimes dwells in a specific state. Next-order mechanisms 
like institutionalization can be expected to stabilize these configurations because 
decisions are then no longer taken randomly (Dubois 2001). 
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Figure 5: The relations among the various subdynamics  
 
Figure 5 summarizes the subdynamics which were distinguished above. While the weakly 
anticipatory system tends to integrate representations by organizing them into an identity, 
the strongly anticipatory one is based on uncertainty contained in the distribution. 
However, this additional degree of freedom cannot be used by this system without the 
mediation of agency using the additional coupling which is provided reflexively. The two 
systems are not only structurally coupled as systems, but also in terms of the reflexive 
operation of providing meaning to each other’s operations.  
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Conclusions 
 
The incursive and hyper-incursive equations provide us with models of meaning-
processing at the individual and supra-individual levels. The incursive equation models 
the operation of a modeling system in relation to the modeled one. This corresponds with 
Rosen’s (1985) definition of an anticipatory system. The hyper-incursive equations 
enable us to model the structural coupling between historical phenomena and emerging 
horizons of meaning. Since hyper-incursion and incursion can recursively be applied to 
the results of the operations, the modeling and simulation of further codification of 
meanings (e.g., into discursive knowledge) becomes feasible.  
 
At the theoretical level, these algorithmic results can be appreciated with reference to the 
Habermas-Luhmann discussion (Habermas & Luhmann 1971) about communicative 
competencies (of agency) versus communication systems. The opposing perspectives in 
this debate can be considered as providing two geometrical metaphors to the algorithmic 
operations of the social system (Leydesdorff, 2000). Geometrical metaphors generate 
their respective “blind spots.” Habermas (1981), for example, shares with Giddens (1984) 
the assumption that the operation of the social system of expectations remains necessarily 
“virtual” and therefore unspecifiable. Luhmann (1984) specified this operation 
theoretically by proposing a deliberate abstraction from human agency (Luhmann, 
1995b).  
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Luhmann’s theory could be used fruitfully as a heuristics in these simulations. However, 
our results suggest that because of the complex relation between structural coupling 
between the two types of systems, and the interpenetrating reflection of their mutual 
operations, decision-making and therefore agency can be considered as back on stage. 
This is endogenous to the system and can also be appreciated as a re-entry. In Luhmann’s 
theory, the social system is considered as operationally closed and this organizational 
reflection can only be formulated as re-entry. However, the alternative perspective of 
considering the system as semi-autopoietic (since dependent for its further development 
on human or organizational reflections and agency) remains also possible. An advantage 
of this latter perspective may be that it is more compatible with mainstream sociological 
theorizing by appreciating reflexive agency while keeping the surplus value of 
Luhmann’s theory. 
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